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Introduction and summary
We have all heard a lot in recent months about the 
soaring number of defaults among subprime mortgage 
borrowers; and while concern over this segment of 
the mortgage market is certainly justified, subprime 
mortgages account for only about one-quarter of the 
total outstanding home mortgage debt in the United 
States. The remaining 75 percent is in prime loans. 
Unlike subprime loans, prime loans are made to bor-
rowers with good credit, who fully document their in-
come and make traditional down payments. Default 
rates on prime loans are increasing rapidly, although 
they remain significantly lower than those on subprime 
loans. For example, among prime loans made in 2005, 
2.2 percent were 60 days or more overdue 12 months 
after the loan was made (our definition of default). For 
loans made in 2006, this percentage nearly doubled to 
4.2 percent, and for loans made in 2007, it rose by an-
other 20 percent, reaching 4.8 percent. By comparison, 
the percentage of subprime loans that had defaulted after 
12 months was 14.6 percent for loans made in 2005, 
20.5 percent for loans made in 2006, and 21.9 percent 
for loans made in 2007. To put these figures in perspec-
tive, among loans originated in 2002 and 2003, the share 
of prime mortgages that defaulted within 12 months 
ranged from 1.4 percent to 2.2 percent and the share of 
defaulting subprime mortgages was less than 7 percent.1 
How do we account for these historically high default 
rates? How have recent trends in home prices affected 
mortgage markets? Could contemporary observers 
have forecasted these high default rates?  
Figure 1, panel A summarizes default patterns for 
prime mortgages; panel B reports similar trends for 
subprime mortgages. Both use loan-level data from 
Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied Analytics. 
Each line in this figure shows the cumulative default 
experience for loans originated in a given year as a 
function of how many months it has been since the 
loan was made. Several patterns are worth noting. 
First, the performance of both prime and subprime 
mortgages has gotten substantially worse, with loans 
made in 2006 and 2007 defaulting at much higher rates. 
The default experience among prime loans made in 
2004 and 2005 is very similar, but for subprime loans, 
default rates are higher for loans made in 2005 than 
in 2004. Default rates among subprime loans are, of 
course, much higher than default rates among prime 
loans. However, the deterioration in the performance 
of prime loans happened more rapidly than it did for 
subprime loans. For example, the percentage of prime 
loans that were 60 days or more overdue grew by  
95 percent for loans made in 2006 compared with 
loans made in 2005. Among subprime loans it grew 
by a relatively modest 53 percent. 
Home prices are likely to play an important role 
in households’ ability and desire to honor mortgage 
commitments. Figure 2 describes trends in home prices 
from 1987 through 2008 for the ten largest metropoli-
tan statistical areas (MSAs). This figure illustrates the 
historically high rates of home price growth from 2002 
through 2005, as well as the sharp reversal in home 
prices beginning in 2006. One of the things we con-
sider in this article is whether prime and subprime loans 
responded similarly to these home price dynamics.
Although the delinquency rate among prime 
mortgages is high and rising fast, it is only about  
one-fifth the delinquency rate for subprime mortgages. 19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Unfortunately, however, this does not mean that total 
losses on prime mortgages will be just one-fifth the 
losses on subprime mortgages. The prime mortgage 
market is much larger than the subprime mortgage 
market, representing about 75 percent of all outstand-
ing mortgages (International Monetary Fund, 2008), 
or a total of $8.3 trillion.2 Taking the third quarter of 
2008 as the starting point, we estimate that total loss-
es from prime loan defaults will be in the neighbor-
hood of $133 billion and that total losses from 
subprime loan defaults will be about $364 billion.3
Losses on prime mortgages are also distributed 
very differently from losses on subprime mortgages. 
Most prime mortgages for amounts at or below 
$417,000 are guaranteed through the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), such as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.4 Losses on these mortgages that exceed 
the ability of the GSEs to satisfy their obligations are 
ultimately borne by the taxpayer.5 In contrast, prime 
mortgages for amounts greater than $417,000 (“jumbo” 
loans) and subprime mortgages were largely securi-
tized privately, and absent government intervention, 
investors in asset-backed securities linked to those 
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mortgages are the ones that are most exposed to de-
clines in their value due to increasing defaults. 
In this article, we make use of loan-level data on 
individual prime and subprime loans made between 
January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2007, to do three 
things: 1) analyze trends in loan and borrower charac-
teristics and in the default experience for prime and sub-
prime loans; 2) estimate empirical relationships between 
home price appreciation, loan and borrower characteris-
tics, and the likelihood of default; and 3) examine 
whether using alternative assumptions about the behav-
ior of home prices could have generated more accu-
rate predictions of defaults. Throughout the analysis, 
we divide the loans into eight groups based on two 
characteristics: prime versus subprime and the “vin-
tage,” the year in which the loan was made. 
First, we describe trends in loan and borrower 
characteristics, as well as the default experience for 
prime and subprime loans for each year from 2004 
through 2007. Next, we estimate empirical models  
of the likelihood that a loan will default in its first  
12 months. This allows us to quantify which factors 
make default more or less likely and to examine how 
the sensitivity to default varies over time and across 
prime and subprime loans. Finally, we use these results 
to examine whether market participants could have 
forecasted default rates more accurately, that is, could 
have made predictions that were closer to actual default 
rates, by using alternative assumptions about the be-
havior of home prices. This article draws on much of 
the very informative literature on the performance of 
subprime loans, including, Bajari, Chu, and Park 
(2008); Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006); 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009); Dell’Ariccia, Igan, 
and Laeven (2008); DiMartino and Duca (2007); Foote 
et al. (2008); Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2008);  
Gerardi et al. (2008); and Mian and Sufi (2009). By  
including prime loans in the analysis, our intention is to 
complement the existing literature on subprime loans. 
By looking at prime and subprime loans side by 
side, we also hope to refine the possible explanations 
for the ongoing mortgage crisis. Both prime and sub-
prime loans have seen rising defaults in recent years, 
as well as very similar patterns of defaults, with loans 
made in more recent years defaulting at higher rates. 
Because of these similarities, it seems reasonable to 
expect that a successful explanation of the subprime 
crisis—the focus of most research to date—should 
also account for the patterns of defaults we observe  
in prime mortgages. 
We find that pessimistic forecasts of home price 
appreciation could have helped to generate predic-
tions of subprime defaults that were closer to the ac-
tual default experience for loans originated in 2006 
and 2007.6 However, for prime loans this would not 
have been enough. Contemporary observers would 
have also had to anticipate that default among prime 
loans would become much more sensitive to changes 
in home prices. Among prime loans originated in 
2006 and 2007, defaults were much more correlated 
with changes in home prices than was the case for 
prime loans originated in 2004 and 2005. While this 
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pattern is straightforward to document now, it would 
have been difficult to anticipate at the time.
Loan and borrower characteristics
In this section, we discuss trends in loan and  
borrower characteristics, as well as the default experi-
ence for prime and subprime loans for each year from 
2004 through 2007.  
Data
The loan-level data we use come from LPS  
Applied Analytics, which gathers data from a number 
of loan servicing companies.7 The most recent data 
include information on 30 million loans, with smaller, 
but still very large, numbers of loans going back in time. 
The data cover prime, subprime, and Alt-A loans,8 
and include loans that are privately securitized, loans 
that are sold to the GSEs, and loans that banks hold on 
their balance sheets. Based on a comparison of the LPS 
and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, 
we estimate that the LPS data cover about 60 percent 
of the prime market each year from 2004 through 2007.9 
Coverage of the subprime market is somewhat small-
er, but increases over time, going from just under  
30 percent in 2004 to just under 50 percent in 2007. 
The total number of loans originated in the LPS 
data in each year of the period we study ranges from 
a high of 6.2 million in 2005 to a low of 4.3 million 
in 2007.10 The mortgage servicers reporting to LPS 
Applied Analytics give each loan a grade of A, B, or 
C, based on the servicer’s assessment of whether the 
loan is prime or subprime. We label A loans as prime 
loans and B and C loans as subprime loans.11 To make 
the analysis tractable, we work with a 1 percent random 
sample of prime loans made between January 1, 2004, 
and December 31, 2007, for a total of 68,000 prime 
loans, and a 10 percent random sample of subprime 
loans made during the same time period, for a total  
of 62,000 subprime loans. 
The LPS data include a wide array of variables 
that capture borrower and loan characteristics, as well 
as the outcome of the loan. The variables that we use 
in the analysis are defined in box 1. In terms of borrower 
characteristics, important variables include the debt-to-
income ratio (DTI) of the borrower (available for a 
subset of loans) and the borrower’s creditworthiness, as 
measured by his Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) score.12 
Some of the loan characteristics that we analyze include 
the loan amount at origination; whether the loan is a 
fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) or adjustable-rate mortgage 
(ARM); the ratio of the loan amount to the value of 
the home at origination (LTV); whether the loan was 
intended for home purchase or refinancing and, in case 
of the latter, whether it involved equity extraction (a 
“cash-out refinance”); and whether the loan was sold 
to one of the GSEs, privately securitized, or held on 
the originating bank’s portfolio. 
The outcome variable that we focus on is whether 
the loan becomes 60 days or more past due in the 12 
months following origination. We focus on the first 
12 months, rather than a longer period, so that loans 
made in 2007 can be analyzed the same way as earlier 
loans, as our data are complete through the end of 2008.13
We augment the loan-level data with information 
on local economic trends and trends in local home prices. 
The economic variable we focus on is the local unem-
ployment rate that comes from U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics monthly MSA-level data. Monthly data on 
home prices are available by MSA from the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)—an independent 
federal agency that is the successor to the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and 
other government entities.14 We use the FHFA’s all 
transactions House Price Index (HPI) that is based on 
repeat sales information.
Trends in loan and borrower characteristics
Many commentators (see, for example, Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert, 2009) have noted that subprime 
lending standards became more lax during the period 
we study, meaning that the typical borrower may have 
received less scrutiny over time that it became easier 
for borrowers to get loans overall, as well as to get 
larger loans. These trends have been particularly well 
documented for subprime loans, but there has been 
less analysis of prime loans. Table 1 summarizes 
mortgage characteristics for each year from 2004 
through 2007 for prime and subprime mortgages. 
Consistent with prior work, we also document 
declining borrower quality over time in the subprime 
sector. For example, the average FICO score for sub-
prime borrowers in 2004 was 617, but it had declined 
to 597 by 2007.15 By contrast, when we look at prime 
loans, the decline in lending standards is less obvious. 
The average FICO score among prime borrowers was 
710 in 2004 and 706 in 2007, a decline of less than  
1 percent. 
Another potential indicator of the riskiness of a 
mortgage is the reason for taking out the loan: to buy 
a house or to refinance an existing mortgage. People 
who are buying a home include first-time home buyers 
who tend to be somewhat riskier, perhaps because they 
have stretched to accumulate the necessary funds to 
purchase a home or perhaps because they tend to be 
younger and have lower incomes. While we do not 




Default (%) first 12 months  Share of loans that are 60 days or more delinquent, in foreclosure,  
or real estate owned within 12 months of origination
Default (%) first 18 months  Share of loans that are 60 days or more delinquent, in foreclosure,  
or real estate owned within 18 months of origination
Default (%) first 21 months  Share of loans that are 60 days or more delinquent, in foreclosure,  
or real estate owned within 21 months of origination
Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) score  Credit score at time of origination (range between 300 and 850,   
with a score above 800 considered very good and a score below  
620 considered poor) 
Loan-to-value ratio (LTV)  Face value of the loan divided by the appraised value of the house at time  
of loan origination
Interest rate at origination  Initial interest rate of loan at origination
Origination amount  Dollar amount of the loan at origination
Conforming loan  Dummy variable equal to 1 for loans that satisfy the following conditions:  
FICO score of at least 620, LTV of at most 80 percent, and loan amount  
at or below the time-varying limit set by the Federal Housing Finance Agency;  
0 otherwise
Debt-to-income ratio (DTI)  Ratio of total monthly debt payments to gross monthly income, computed  
at origination
DTI missing  Dummy variable equal to 1 if DTI is not available from the mortgage  
servicer; 0 otherwise
Cash-out refinance  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan refinances an existing mortgage  
while increasing the loan amount; 0 otherwise
Purchase loan  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is used for a property purchase;  
0 otherwise
Investment property loan  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is for a non-owner-occupied property;  
0 otherwise
Loan sold to government-sponsored  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is sold to a GSE; 0 otherwise 
  enterprise (GSE) 
Loan sold to private securitizer  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is sold to a non-GSE investor;   
  0 otherwise
Loan held on portfolio  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is held on originator’s portfolio; 
0 otherwise
Prepayment penalty  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is originated with a prepayment  
penalty; 0 otherwise
Adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM)  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan’s interest rate is adjusted periodically, 
and the rate at origination is kept fixed for an introductory period; 0 if it is  
a fixed-rate mortgage (FRM), a loan whose rate is fixed at origination for its 
entire term 
Margin rate   Spread relative to some time-varying reference rate (usually London interbank 
offered rate, or Libor), applicable after the first interest rate reset for an ARM
House Price Index (HPI) growth  Change in metropolitan-statistical-area-level (MSA-level) housing price  
index in the 12 months after origination, reported by the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency
Unemployment rate  Average change in the MSA-level unemployment rate in the 12 months after 
origination, reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Median annual income in zip code  Median annual income in the zip code where property is located, as  
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first-time home buyers or to individuals who have 
owned a home before, we do know that the fraction 
of home purchase loans among prime mortgages is 
roughly 50 percent and stays at about that rate through-
out the 2004–07 period. Among subprime mortgages, 
about 40 percent of loans are for home purchase in 
2004–06; this share drops to just under 30 percent of 
subprime loans made in 2007. 
Like home purchase loans, refinancing transac-
tions probably include both individuals who are less 
likely to default after they refinance and those who are 
more likely to default. For example, a household that 
refinances the existing balance on its original mortgage 
to take advantage of falling interest rates will have 
lower monthly payments that should be easier to 
maintain, even if it experiences a period of economic 
hardship. In contrast, a household that refinances its 
mortgage to extract equity (a cash-out refinance) when 
the value of its home increases may end up being more 
vulnerable to future home price declines, especially if 
its new mortgage has a higher loan-to-value ratio. To 
the extent that the practice of cash-out refinancing was 
common over the period we study, increases in home 
prices may be associated with constant or even increas-
ing leverage rather than with safer loans and a bigger 
cushion against future price declines. In this way, greater 
prevalence of cash-out refinancing transactions may be 
indicative of increasing risk in the universe of existing 
loans. The percentage of loans that involved refinancing 
together with cashing out some of the built-up equity 
is much lower for prime loans than for subprime loans, 
but it increases for both over the 2004–07 period.
As indicated in table 1 (p. 23), mortgage servicers 
assign many refinancing transactions to the ambiguous 
category of “refinancing with unknown cash-out.” Nev-
ertheless, among prime loans made in 2004, 12 percent 
were known to involve cash-outs. By 2005, this per-
centage had risen to about 21 percent, and it remained 
at this level through 2007 (the share of unclassified 
refinancing transactions remained fairly constant over 
time). For subprime loans made in 2004, 35 percent 
were refinancing transactions involving known cash-outs; 
for those made in 2005, 43 percent; for those made in 
2006, 47 percent; and for those made in 2007, a stag-
gering 57 percent. Put differently, cash-out loans ac-
counted for at least 82 percent (0.575/0.7) of all 
subprime mortgage refinancing transactions in 2007. 
Another loan characteristic that might be an im-
portant determinant of subsequent defaults is whether 
the interest rate is fixed for the life of the contract or 
allowed to adjust periodically (as in adjustable-rate 
mortgages). When an ARM resets after the initial  
defined period (which may be as short as one year or 
as long as seven), the interest rate and, consequently, 
the monthly mortgage payment, may go up substan-
tially. Higher payments may put enough stress on some 
households so that they fall behind on their mortgages. 
While these loans seem attractive because of low in-
troductory interest rates (and low initial payments), 
they expose borrowers to additional risk if interest 
rates go up or if credit becomes less available in gen-
eral. Some ARMs have relatively long introductory 
periods of five to seven years before the contract in-
terest rate increases. Other ARMs have short intro-
ductory periods of one to three years.16 With longer 
introductory periods, borrowers have more time to 
build up equity in their homes before they need to  
refinance to avoid the interest rate reset. 
The percentage of subprime ARMs was 73 percent 
in 2004, 69 percent in 2005, and 62 percent in 2006. 
By 2007, it had fallen to 39 percent, since the avail-
ability of these types of loans declined in the second 
half of the year. Importantly, nearly all subprime ARMs 
have introductory periods of three years or less, which 
makes borrowers with these loans very dependent on 
the ability to refinance. In contrast, loans to prime bor-
rowers are predominantly made as fixed-rate contracts 
(about 75 percent of all prime loans), and the majority 
of prime ARMs have introductory periods of five to 
seven years. The decline in the share of ARMs in 2007, 
evident in both the prime and subprime markets, mir-
rors the virtual disappearance of the securitization 
market for ARMs with introductory periods of three 
years or less in the second half of 2007. 
One oft-mentioned culprit for the subprime crisis 
is the growth of lenders that followed the “originate-
to-distribute model” (see, for example, Keys et al., 2010, 
and Calomiris, 2008). These lenders sold virtually all 
of the mortgages they made, typically to private secu-
ritizers. Because these lenders do not face a financial 
loss if these mortgages eventually default, they have 
relatively little incentive to screen and monitor borrowers. 
In addition to selling loans to private securitizers, the 
lenders can hold loans on their own portfolios or sell 
them to one of the GSEs. Only loans that meet certain 
criteria (borrower with a FICO score of at least 620, 
loan value of $417,000 or less, and an LTV of 80 per-
cent or less) can generally be sold to the GSEs.17 
Most subprime loans cannot be sold to GSEs and must 
be either privately securitized or held on portfolio. 
One of the striking facts in table 1 (p. 23) is the 
extent of loan securitization. The LPS data overstate 
the actual extent of securitization somewhat because 
the data are made up of loans serviced by the large 
mortgage servicers (see note 7). It is more common 
for smaller banks to hold loans on portfolio and also to 25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
service them internally. Portfolio loans are therefore 
underrepresented in the LPS data.18 That being said, 
the LPS data indicate that within the first month of 
origination, about half of prime mortgages made in 
2004 remained in their originators’ portfolios. This figure 
declined to about 40 percent among the prime loans 
made in each of the subsequent years in the data. The 
level of “rapid” securitization has been consistently 
higher for subprime loans, whose originators retained 
just over 40 percent of loans made in 2004 and less 
than 30 percent of them made in the following years. 
The observed differences in the speed of turning the 
loan over to outside investors do not translate to dif-
ferences in the extent of eventual securitization. Indeed, 
by the end of the first year since origination, the share 
of loans kept on portfolio drops to low single digits for 
both prime and subprime mortgages. Not surprisingly, 
nearly all subprime mortgages are securitized by private 
investors, and GSEs dominate the securitization of prime 
mortgages. However, by the second half of 2007, the 
private securitization market had all but disappeared. 
The fraction of subprime loans originated in 2007 that 
were privately securitized was just 55 percent, with 
most of these loans being made in the first half of the 
year. The GSEs took up much of the slack, accounting 
for about 40 percent of all subprime securitizations.19
Estimates of default
In this section, we estimate empirical models of the 
likelihood that a loan will default in its first 12 months. 
This allows us to quantify which factors make default 
more or less likely and to examine how the sensitivity 
to default varies over time and across prime and sub-
prime loans.
Econometric model
Mortgages can have multiple sources of risk—for 
example, low credit quality, high loan-to-value ratios, 
and contract interest rates that reset shortly after orig-
ination. To take into account these and other factors 
that might influence default rates, we estimate a num-
ber of multivariate regression models that allow us to 
examine the effect of varying one risk factor while 
holding others fixed. 
The analysis sample includes loans that do not 
default and are observed for 12 months after origina-
tion and loans that default (become 60 days or more 
past due) within 12 months of origination. We drop 
nondefaulting loans that we do not observe for at 
least 12 months from the sample. In effect we are 
dropping loans for one of three reasons: The loan was 
transferred to a different mortgage servicer, the loan 
was refinanced in its first 12 months, or we did not have 
complete data for the loan. For prime and subprime loans 
originated in 2004–06, between 13 percent and 16 percent 
of loans were eliminated for one of these reasons. For 
loans originated in 2007, the fraction of loans eliminated 
fell to 7.5 percent of subprime loans and 8.6 percent 
of prime loans. Among loans that were eliminated, the 
most common reason was refinancing.20 On the one 
hand, this is a concern for the analysis because loans 
that refinance within 12 months of origination may 
differ systematically from other loans. The most striking 
difference that we observe is that the loans that refinance 
“early” tend to be in areas that experienced higher-than-
average home price growth. This suggests that we may 
be dropping some potentially risky loans from the 
analysis, since the areas that saw the greatest home 
price growth were often the ones that saw the greatest 
eventual declines in home prices. It is also important 
to keep in mind that some of the new loans on these 
properties are probably included in the analysis, since 
the new loan may have met the criteria for staying in 
the sample. On the other hand, keeping early refinanced 
and transferred loans in the sample would understate 
the share of actual defaults, since by definition these 
loans are current for the duration of their (short) pres-
ence in the sample.
Our goal is to evaluate the relative strength of  
associations between loan default and observable  
borrower, loan, and macroeconomic characteristics in 
different market segments and different years. To that 
end, we estimate the following regression:
1)   Prob (default within 12 months)ijk = Φ(β1Loanijk,  
  β2Borrowerijk, β3Econjk, β4Dk).
The dependent variable is an indicator of whether a 
loan to borrower i, originated in an MSA j in state k 
defaulted within the first 12 months. Default is defined 
as being 60 days or more past due. We model this proba-
bility as a function of loan and borrower characteristics, 
MSA-level economic variables (unemployment, home 
price appreciation, and income), and a set of state dummy 
variables (Dk) that capture aspects of the economic 
and regulatory environment that vary at the state level. 
We estimate the model as a standard maximum likeli-
hood probit with state fixed effects.21
To retain maximum flexibility in evaluating the 
importance of covariates for prime and subprime de-
faults, we carry out separate estimations of equation 1 
for prime and subprime loans. To achieve similar flexi-
bility over time, we further subdivide each of the prime 
and subprime samples by year of origination (2004 
through 2007).   26 2Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
The economic variables include both the realized 
growth in the FHFA HPI and the average realized un-
employment rate. Both of these variables are measured 
at the MSA level, and both are computed over the 12 
months after loan origination. Consequently, they match 
the period over which we are tracking loan performance. 
In contrast to all of the other regressors, this informa-
tion clearly would not be available to the analyst at 
the time of loan origination. We can think of the model 
described in equation 1 as the sort of analysis one would 
be able to do for 2004 loans at the end of 2005. At this 
point, one would be able to observe what happened to 
home prices and unemployment rates over the same 
period. The same exercise can be performed for loans 
originated in 2005 at the end of 2006, for loans origi-
nated in 2006 at the end of 2007, and so on. 
This is a different exercise than trying to forecast 
whether or not a loan will default based on its charac-
teristics at the time of its origination. Instead, this frame-
work allows us to explore whether the abrupt reversal 
in home price appreciation contributed much to the 
explosion in defaults on loans originated in 2006 and 
2007. As shown in figure 2 (p. 20) and table 1 (p. 23), 
growth in home price rates varies enormously over the 
four years of our sample period. The 2004 figure of 
13.44 percent home price growth for prime loans rep-
resents the average realized 12-month HPI growth 
rate for loans originated in January–December of 2004. 
As such, it averages 12-month home price apprecia-
tion over two years (2004 and 2005) for a nationally 
representative sample of prime mortgages. By 2006, 
these growth rates fall below 2 percent, and then turn 
negative in 2007. The realized price appreciation (and 
depreciation) of homes financed through subprime loans 
shown in table 1 (p. 23) is remarkably similar to the 
values of homes financed through prime loans. Subprime 
mortgage defaults have been associated with parts of 
the country where home prices grew very fast and then 
declined even more rapidly (for example, California, 
Florida, and Arizona). On average, however, subprime 
and prime mortgages appear to have been made in 
similar locations, so we do not observe large differences 
in home price growth across the two loan categories. 
This means that our analysis examines how different 
market segments responded to fairly similar shocks to 
home values. In contrast with HPI growth, unemploy-
ment rates showed little variation over time or across 
prime and subprime loan groups. 
Results
The results of the estimation are summarized in 
table 2. The first four columns of data depict estimates 
for prime loans originated in each of the four sample 
years, and the next four columns contain the estimates 
for subprime loans. The juxtaposition of the data for 
the two market segments allows us to easily compare 
the importance of certain factors. The table presents 
estimates of the marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables, rather than the coefficients themselves. The 
marginal effects tell us how a one-unit change in each 
explanatory variable changes the probability that a 
loan defaults in its first 12 months, holding fixed the 
impact of the other explanatory variables. For dummy 
variables, the marginal effects show the change in the 
probability of default when the variable in question 
goes from zero to one. 
The defaults of both prime and subprime loans 
are strongly associated with a number of key loan and 
borrower characteristics. These include the FICO score, 
the LTV, and the interest rate at origination. These vari-
ables are strongly statistically significant in virtually 
every estimation year for each loan type. For instance, 
higher FICO scores are strongly associated with lower 
default probabilities. For prime loans, an increase of 
100 points in the FICO score in 2004 is associated with 
about a 120-basis-point decrease in default likelihood 
(the estimated marginal effect of –0.00012, in the first 
column, sixth row of table 2, multiplied by 100). The 
same result is obtained for 2005. The point estimates of 
marginal effects for 2006 and 2007 increase about two-
fold for prime loans, but so does the baseline sample 
default rate. For subprime loans, the estimated marginal 
effects are a full order of magnitude higher, implying 
that the same improvement in FICO scores generates 
a greater decline in subprime defaults, at least in ab-
solute terms. 
Similarly, higher LTV values have a strong posi-
tive association with defaults for both loan types orig-
inated in 2005, 2006, and 2007. For subprime loans, a 
rise in LTV generates a stronger absolute increase in loan 
defaults. It must be noted that the effect of the leverage 
on the likelihood of default may be understated by the 
LTV measure that we have. A better measure of how 
leveraged a borrower is on a given property would be 
the combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV). The CLTV 
takes into account second-lien loans on the property 
in computing the ratio of indebtedness to the value of 
the underlying collateral. This variable is not available 
in the LPS data, however. If the practice of obtaining 
such “piggyback loans” is more prevalent in the sub-
prime market, then the estimated coefficient for LTV 
for subprime loans may be biased downward.
At first glance, the interest rate at origination is 
similar to LTV and FICO score in having a strong sta-
tistical and economic effect on both prime and sub-
prime loan defaults in each origination year. What 27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
stands out is the sheer magnitude of the estimated  
effects. However, one must be cautious in interpret-
ing hypothetical marginal effects of the interest rate. 
While LTV and FICO score cover fairly wide ranges 
for both prime and subprime loans, interest rate values 
are more tightly distributed.22 For example, the stan-
dard deviation of interest rates on prime loans across 
all years of our sample is 81 basis points: A one stan-
dard deviation increase in the interest rate for prime 
loans would raise the average rate from 6.25 percent 
to 7.06 percent. The equivalent one standard deviation 
increase in interest rates for subprime loans would raise 
the average rate from 7.93 percent to 9.24 percent. If 
we see two loans with otherwise identical characteristics 
but one has a higher interest rate, a likely explanation 
is that the lender has additional information about the 
credit quality of the borrower and is charging a higher 
interest rate to take into account additional risk factors, 
over and above those that are captured by the borrower’s 
FICO score. 
There are also a number of notable differences 
between the prime and subprime samples. Perhaps the 
most interesting finding is the different sensitivity of 
defaults to changes in home prices. For subprime loans, 
defaults are much lower when home price growth is 
higher for three out of the four sample years. This re-
lationship is particularly striking for 2006 loan origi-
nations, many of which experienced home price declines 
over their first 12 months. For prime loans, 2006 is 
the only year of origination in which changes in home 
prices are significantly correlated with loan defaults. 
These results suggest that, relative to subprime defaults, 
prime defaults have a weaker relationship with home 
prices, once key borrower and loan characteristics 
(LTV, FICO score, and so on) are taken into account. 
The contrast between prime and subprime loans 
is even sharper for the debt-to-income ratio and loan 
margin rate. The DTI is widely considered to be one 
of the main determinants of loan affordability, since it 
relates household monthly income to debt service flows. 
The DTI for prime loans is not significantly correlated 
with defaults, except for loans originated in 2007, but 
it matters consistently for subprime loans. The absence 
of any measurable effects of DTI even on defaults of 
prime loans originated in 2006 can be interpreted as a 
sign of the resilience of prime borrowers who experi-
enced significant changes in the prices of their homes.
The loan margin rate is one of the key terms in 
an ARM contract. It defines the spread to a reference 
rate (usually the London interbank offered rate, or Libor). 
At reset, the ARM’s interest rate goes up to the sum 
of Libor and the loan margin. The margin is set by the 
lender, and is often thought to capture additional aspects 
of a borrower’s creditworthiness. This is consistent 
with the fact that the margin rate is, on average, sub-
stantially higher for subprime borrowers (see table 1, 
p. 23). We find that this variable has no association 
with defaults among prime loans, with the exception 
of loans originated in 2006. In contrast, defaults on 
subprime loans originated in every year except 2007 
are significantly higher for loans with higher margin 
rates, all else being equal. This suggests that, for the 
subprime borrower, the margin rate contains addition-
al information on borrower quality not reflected in 
FICO scores and other loan characteristics. It is also 
interesting that ARMs with introductory periods of 
three years or less—the most common mortgage con-
tract in the subprime market—have the same correla-
tion with subprime defaults as fixed-rate mortgages 
do. Put differently, once loan and borrower character-
istics are accounted for, the choice of an ARM with a 
short introductory period is not associated with higher 
subprime defaults.   
Several other results merit comment. For prime 
loans, being securitized within one month of origination 
(as opposed to remaining in the lender’s portfolio) is 
associated with lower defaults for loans made in 2004, 
2005, and 2006. This does not necessarily mean that 
the securitization process has been successful in iden-
tifying loans of higher quality. Since nearly all loans 
in the sample are securitized over the 12-month default 
horizon (see table 1, p. 23), the difference in defaults 
probably captures differences between fast-to-securi-
tize and slow-to-securitize originators, rather than 
differences between securitized loans and those held 
on portfolio. We find similar results for securitized 
subprime loans made in 2005, 2006, and 2007. Sub-
prime loans also have extremely high rates of eventual 
securitization, and the relationship between subprime 
default and securitization can be interpreted in the same 
way. This hints at the possibility that originators with 
business models focused on securitization are better at 
screening loan quality. These originators would have 
more to lose if their reputations were damaged by weak 
ex post performance of the loans they originated. 
Finally, we note that purchase loans, as opposed 
to refinance loans, are consistently associated with 
higher defaults in nearly all sample years, in both the 
prime and subprime market segments. This may seem 
surprising, since borrowers who extract equity from 
their homes in cash-out refinancings may be particu-
larly vulnerable to economic shocks and experience 
higher defaults as a result. However, not all cash-out 
refinancing is done by borrowers who need to finance 
current consumption. Since a prerequisite for any cash-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































equity, these borrowers, as a group, may 
have a greater incentive to avoid defaults 
to maintain this option for the future. In 
addition, purchase loans include first-time 
home buyers who, in retrospect, were buy-
ing houses at the peak of the market and 
had little time to build up equity to offset 
subsequent price declines. 
Comparisons across years and across 
loan types
Since table 2 contains regression  
estimates from multiple nonoverlapping 
samples, the comparison of the relative 
importance of the explanatory variables 
can be tricky. The distribution of loan 
characteristics varies from year to year  
and across prime and subprime loans. In 
addition, the baseline rates of actual de-
faults are quite different across samples. 
Because of this, one cannot simply com-
pare two point estimates and conclude  
that a bigger one indicates a stronger cor-
respondence with defaults. 
To compare the relative importance  
of the explanatory variables across the 
samples, we conduct the following exer-
cise. For each independent variable, we 
change its value for each observation by  
a specified increment. Then, we compute 
the predicted sample default rate using  
estimated coefficients for each year of 
origination and loan type. We compare the 
new predicted default to the original one. 
The difference between the original pre-
diction and the new one tells us the mar-
ginal contribution of that variable to the 
overall default rate.23 We compare these 
figures across years and across prime loans 
(table 3, panel A) and subprime loans  
(table 3, panel B). For example, for 2004 
prime loans we increase all FICO scores 
by 50 points, predict a new default rate, 
and compare it to the original default rate. 
The difference is –1.16 percentage points, 
or a 53 percent decrease in the likelihood 
of default for loans originated in 2004 
(fourth column, second full row of table 3, 
panel A). For brevity, we look at just six 
key explanatory variables: HPI growth, 
FICO score, LTV, DTI, interest rate at 
origination, and loan margin rate.24 Table 3 
also reports the mean of the relevant vari-
able, its standard deviation, and the absolute 30 2Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
change that we impose. We tried to keep the magni-
tude of the absolute changes reasonably close to the 
standard deviations. 
An increase of 10 percentage points in home price 
appreciation (HPI growth) substantially lowers default 
probabilities (first full row of each panel in table 3). 
This effect is more consistent for subprime loans origi-
nated in various years, where it translates to decreases 
of between 10 percent and 18 percent relative to the 
baseline default rate in 2004, 2005, and 2006. For prime 
loans, the 10-percentage-point increase in the HPI has 
a big effect only for loans originated in 2006, where 
the estimates imply that defaults would have been 1.78 
percentage points, or 42 percent, lower. The effect of 
FICO score stands out. A 50-point uniform increase in 
FICO scores (second full row of each panel) is asso-
ciated with a 41 percent to 53 percent decline in pre-
dicted default rates relative to the baseline for prime 
loans, and a 20 percent to 34 percent relative decline 
for subprime loans. The average marginal effects of 
the LTV are greater (in a relative sense) for prime loans 
than for subprime loans.25 Finally, higher interest rates 
at origination appear to generate incredible increases 
in defaults for both market segments. For instance, a 
1 percentage point increase in interest rates translates 
into a jump in defaults on 2007 prime loans of more 
than 3 percentage points—a rise of 66 percent relative 
to the actual default rate. Increasing everyone’s interest 
rates by 1 percentage point is equivalent to a substan-
tial deterioration in the quality of the borrower pool, and 
thus translates into much higher predicted defaults. As 
mentioned earlier, the DTI and the margin rate do not 
have strong associations with prime mortgage defaults. 
In contrast, higher values of these variables consis-
tently indicate higher default rates for subprime mort-
gages. However, the economic magnitude of marginal 
effects of DTI and the margin rate on defaults (fourth 
and sixth full rows of each panel) is somewhat muted. 
What if?
In this section, we use the estimates discussed 
previously to do two things. First, we examine how 
much (or how little) of the increase in mortgage de-
faults from 2004 through 2007 can be explained by 
changes in the characteristics of loans and borrowers, 
as opposed to changes in the responsiveness of de-
faults to those characteristics. Next, we examine how 
forecasts of prime and subprime mortgage defaults 
vary with different assumptions about the future path 
of home prices.
Predicted versus actual defaults
The descriptive regressions in the previous section 
provide insights into the factors that are associated with 
realized defaults for different types of loans originated 
in different years. An open question is how useful these 
relationships could have been in forecasting the defaults 
of future loans. To address this, we conduct the fol-
lowing thought experiment. For each set of estimates, 
we compute predicted defaults using observed loan, 
borrower, and economic characteristics from other 
origination years. For instance, we take the relationship 
between borrower characteristics and loan character-
istics that we estimate using data from prime loans 
originated in 2004 (the marginal effects reported in 
the first column of table 2, pp. 28–29) and see what  
it would imply for defaults for prime loans originated 
in 2007. In other words, we pick a particular year and 
fix the relationship (that is, the estimated coefficients) 
between defaults and characteristics, but let the charac-
teristics vary as they actually did in the data. This ex-
ercise lets us see to what extent higher defaults on loans 
originated in 2007 can be explained by changes in 
characteristics alone. We show these results in table 4, 
where this exercise is carried out separately for prime 
loans (panels A and B) and subprime loans (panels C 
and D). Panels A and C of the table show the predicted 
default rate for loans originated in each of the sample 
years (rows) using the coefficients estimated with data 
from each of the sample years (columns). The numbers 
in bold that run diagonally through the panels are pre-
dictions that use characteristics and coefficients from 
the same year. A useful way to summarize the results 
is to look at predictions below and above the diagonal 
bold entries. Those below the diagonal bold entries 
are forecasts of future defaults using historical models 
(for example, relationships between characteristics and 
defaults from 2004 and characteristics from 2007). Those 
above the diagonal run this exercise in reverse—they ap-
ply recent model estimates to loans from earlier years 
(for example, relationships between characteristics and 
defaults from 2007 and characteristics from 2004). 
These two groups of predictions are strikingly differ-
ent in terms of their predictions relative to the actual 
realized default rates.
Perhaps the easiest way to see this is in panels B 
and D of table 4, which express predicted defaults as a 
percentage of realized defaults. The diagonal forecasts 
in those two panels are close to 100 percent. This is a 
feature of the estimation procedure. However, forward-
looking forecasts—those below the diagonal bold 
entries—are nearly always less than 100 percent for 
both prime and subprime loans.26 This means that predic-
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TABLE 4
Predicted probability of defaulting within 12 months of mortgage origination
  Prediction model coefficients from 
Mortgages originated in  Actual default rate  2004  2005  2006  2007
  ( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - percent  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
A. Prime mortgages: Predicted default rate          
  2004  2.21  2.20  2.55  1.47  2.86
  2005  2.17  2.04  2.17  1.72  3.77
  2006  4.23  3.09  3.08  4.22  5.62
  2007  4.83  3.54  3.49  5.82  4.82
         
B. Prime mortgages: Predicted default rate as percentage of actual default rate
  2004  100  99.89  115.63  66.63  129.72
  2005  100  93.94  99.77  79.15  173.55
  2006  100  72.98  72.68  99.73  132.71
  2007  100  73.32  72.11  120.45  99.77
           
C. Subprime mortgages: Predicted default rate
  2004  10.76  10.75  13.72  13.26  16.62
  2005  15.72  13.56  15.71  16.78  19.93
  2006  23.99  19.92  20.68  23.96  24.95
  2007  25.39  22.27  23.06  25.49  25.38
         
D. Subprime mortgages: Predicted default rate as percentage of actual default rate
  2004  100  99.83  127.48  123.21  154.41
  2005  100  86.31  99.98  106.80  126.78
  2006  100  83.04  86.20  99.89  104.01
  2007  100  87.70  90.80  100.40  99.97
Notes: Average predicted default rate for mortgages, using estimated coefficients from different mortgage origination years. Bold numbers are  
predictions that use characteristics and coefficients from the same year. See the text for further details.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied Analytics.
and defaults from 2004 and 2005 uniformly underpredict 
defaults in 2006 and 2007. The underprediction is more 
dramatic for prime loans, where less than 75 percent 
of the realized defaults in 2006 and 2007 are accounted 
for by the “old” relationships between characteristics 
and defaults. Even for subprime loans, the shortfall is 
substantial, suggesting increased defaults cannot be 
accounted for by changes in loan characteristics alone. 
The relationship between observable loan and economic 
characteristics and defaults appears to have changed 
for loans originated after 2005. The sharp rise in the 
default rate cannot be explained just by looser under-
writing standards or by changes in the composition  
of loan contracts.
In contrast, the backward-looking forecasts—
those above the diagonal bold entries—are typically 
greater than 100 percent. This means that the world 
described by defaults observed in 2006 and 2007 
would have resulted in defaults higher than observed 
in 2004 and 2005. This overprediction holds uniform-
ly for subprime mortgages, but not for the predictions 
based on the 2006 model of prime defaults. More-
over, the overprediction is particularly severe for the 
2007-based model coefficients, again suggesting a 
structural difference in the determinants of loan de-
faults that occurred after the rapid reversal in home 
price appreciation.
What role do home prices play? 
We turn our attention now to the role of home 
prices. We know that home prices were increasing 
very rapidly in 2004 and 2005 and began to fall quite 
dramatically beginning in 2006. A closer look at the 
potential impact of this shock may help to illuminate 
why defaults of both prime and subprime mortgages 
increased so much. We are also interested in refining 
the discussion by being very clear about what infor-
mation would have been available to analysts at dif-
ferent points in time. This will allow us to gauge the 
extent to which market participants were “surprised” 
by the performance of prime and subprime loans 
originated in 2006 and 2007. 
The results in table 4 give the impression that an 
analyst would be able to predict 2006 loan defaults, 
using 2005 model estimates. In reality, this would not 
have been possible because the model of 2005 defaults 33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 5
Mortgage default rate forecasts under different assumptions for the 
future path of home prices 
     
  Predictions
  for mortgages  Actual
Model year coefficients  originated in   default rate  Scenario I  Scenario II  Scenario III
  ( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - percent - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
A. Default rate forecasts for prime mortgages
  2004  2006  4.23  3.09  3.03  3.07
  2005  2007  4.83  3.49  3.39  3.43
B. Default rate forecasts for subprime mortgages
  2004  2006  23.99  19.92  17.47  20.32
  2005  2007  25.39  23.06  21.51  22.18
 
 
  Prime mortgages  Subprime mortgages  All mortgages
Mortgages originated in  Scenario I   Scenario II  Scenario I  Scenario II  Scenario III
  ( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - percent - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
C. Average HPI growth rates assumed in each scenario
  2004  13.44  10.63  13.99  12.89  0.00
  2005  9.10  14.30  9.70  15.00  0.00
  2006  1.94  9.57  1.52  9.87  0.00
  2007  –4.19  2.65  –3.94  3.29  0.00                  
Notes: The forecast horizon is 12 months since mortgage origination. HPI means House Price Index from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. 
Scenario I is perfect foresight; it uses actual realized HPI growth. Scenario II is a simple extrapolation; it uses the HPI growth rate from the  
preceding 12 months. Scenario III assumes zero HPI growth for the forecasting period. See the text for further details.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied Analytics.   
could only be estimated in full in December 2006 
when loans made in December 2005 had been ob-
served for a full 12 months. Moreover, some of the key 
variables—notably, future growth in the HPI—are not 
of course available at the time a loan is made. To create 
estimates of default predictions that take into account 
only the available information, we conduct a series of 
experiments that are reported in table 5. 
In panels A and B of table 5, the first row presents 
predicted defaults for 2006, using coefficients from 
estimates of default for loans made in 2004. The in-
formation necessary to do this exercise would not have 
been available at the beginning of 2006. In panels A 
and B of table 5, the second row does the same for 2007 
defaults, using coefficients from estimates of default 
for loans made in 2005. Each of the scenarios uses the 
same coefficients (2004 or 2005), but differs in assump-
tions about HPI growth. Scenario I assumes that the 
analyst can perfectly predict future home prices (this 
simply restates the appropriate value from table 4). 
Scenario II assumes that an analyst forecasts that the 
MSA-specific HPI growth in a given year will change 
by exactly as much as it did in the most recent observ-
able 12-month period. In other words, for a particular 
MSA, HPI growth in 2006 will look just like it did in 
2005, and this growth in 2007 will look just like it did 
in 2006. In scenario III, the hypothetical analyst becomes 
very pessimistic and assumes that house prices in 2006 
and 2007 will not grow at all. Panel C of table 5 sum-
marizes the average MSA-level HPI growth rates as-
sumed in each scenario for prime and subprime loans.
The results for prime loans (table 5, panel A) 
suggest that varying assumptions about HPI growth 
has little effect on predicted default rates. Whether one 
uses past experience to extrapolate future home price 
growth or arbitrarily sets the growth rate to zero, the 
model substantially underpredicts the actual default rate. 
The historical experience in the prime market for loans 
originated in 2004 and 2005 suggested that there was 
essentially no relationship between home price appre-
ciation and loan defaults. Using the experience of mort-
gages originated during this period together with any 
assumption about HPI growth would not have helped 
analysts forecast the spike in prime loan defaults. What 
would have been helpful would have been if an analyst 
could have foreseen that prime mortgages might respond 
to home prices the way subprime mortgages did. 
Even when home price appreciation was relatively 
high during 2004 and 2005, default rates among sub-
prime borrowers were quite sensitive to home prices. 34 2Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
Indeed, the results for the subprime loans, shown in 
table 5, panel B, suggest that assuming zero price growth 
would have gone a long way in closing the gap be-
tween forecasts based on simple extrapolation of past 
growth and actual defaults. This is especially true for 
loans originated during 2006, which proved to be the 
pivotal year for home prices and loan performance. For 
those loans, extrapolation of past trends using coeffi-
cients from estimates of default for loans made in 2004 
predicted default rates of 17.5 percent. With the assump-
tion of zero growth, the same model produced default 
rates of 20.3 percent, much closer to the actual rate of 
24 percent. Even relying on the somewhat stale coef-
ficient estimates, it appears to have been possible to 
forecast a sharp deterioration in default rates on sub-
prime loans with fairly mild HPI growth assumptions. 
However, the same cannot be said for prime loans. 
Conclusion
We have analyzed the default experience of prime 
and subprime loans originated over the period 2004–07. 
Similar to other studies, we document some decline 
in underwriting standards during this period for both 
prime and subprime loans. We also find that character-
istics such as the loan-to-value ratio, FICO score, and 
interest rate at origination are important predictors of 
defaults for both prime and subprime loans. However, 
changes in loan and borrower characteristics are not 
enough to have predicted the incredible increase we 
have seen in prime and subprime mortgage defaults. 
While changes in borrower and loan characteristics 
can get us closer to observed default rates for sub-
prime loans than they can for prime loans, for both 
market segments there were other factors at work. 
Home prices play a very important role in deter-
mining mortgage outcomes; this became particularly 
evident for subprime loans by the end of 2005. For 
prime loans, it is only when we analyze data through 
the end of 2007 (that is, evaluate the performance of 
loans originated in 2006) that we are able to docu-
ment this sensitivity. Even very pessimistic assump-
tions about the future path of home prices would not 
have been enough to substantially improve contem-
poraneous forecasts of prime mortgage defaults for 
loans made in 2006 and 2007. In hindsight, of course, 
it appears self-evident that the relationships between 
HPI growth and defaults on prime loans might be dif-
ferent in periods with declining home prices. However, 
recognizing this in real time would not have been 
possible using the available data from the recent past. 
It could, perhaps, have been done by analyzing data 
that included earlier episodes of substantial regional 
home price declines. 35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
NOTES
1These numbers are based on authors’ calculations using data from 
Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied Analytics, described in 
detail later in the article.
2This figure is equal to 75 percent of total home mortgage debt  
outstanding of $11,121.2 billion in the third quarter of 2008, reported 
in table L.2, line 11 of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System’s Z.1 release, dated March 12, 2009, available  
at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.   
3We emphasize that these are estimates of the direct costs from 
mortgage defaults, not the cost to society. These estimates use data 
from the Mortgage Bankers Association on the fraction of prime and 
subprime mortgages that are past due or in foreclosure as of the end 
of the third quarter of 2008. For prime mortgages, 4.34 percent are 
30 days past due, 2.11 percent of prime mortgages are 60 days or 
more past due, and 1.58 percent are in foreclosure. For subprime 
mortgages, the analogous figures are 20.03 percent, 11.47 percent, 
and 12.55 percent. See www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/
PressCenter/66626.htm. We assume that 70 percent of subprime 
mortgages that are 60 days or more past due will eventually go into 
foreclosure and that 40 percent of subprime loans that are 30 days 
past due will become seriously delinquent. For prime mortgages, 
we assume that 25 percent of loans that are 30 days past due become 
seriously delinquent and that 50 percent of seriously delinquent 
loans eventually foreclose. For both prime and subprime mortgages, 
we assume that lenders lose 50 percent of the outstanding value of 
the loan in foreclosure. These estimates are of course very sensitive 
to the assumptions. If we assume that a higher fraction of past due 
subprime loans eventually default compared with prime loans, the 
difference in the loss amounts will be larger. Note also that these 
estimates do not include any mark-to-market losses on securities 
associated with the underlying mortgages.
4The full official name for Fannie Mae is the Federal National 
Mortgage Association. The full official name for Freddie Mac is  
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.
5Note that we are abstracting from the potential role of private mort-
gage insurers here.
6In our pessimistic forecasts, home prices stay flat in 2006 and 
2007. Although such forecasts must have looked gloomy in 2005, 
the actual experience for home prices turned out to be quite a bit 
worse, particularly in 2007. 
7The servicers included in the data set are those that participate  
in the HOPE NOW alliance (www.hopenow.com/members.
html#mortgage). This alliance includes some of the country’s  
largest home lenders—Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorgan 
Chase, and Wells Fargo.
8Alt-A loans are a middle category of loans—riskier than prime 
and less risky than subprime. They are generally made to borrowers 
with good credit ratings, but the loans have characteristics that make 
them ineligible to be sold to the GSEs—for example, limited docu-
mentation of the income or assets of the borrower or higher loan-
to-value ratios than those specified by GSE limits.
9Note that the HMDA data do not represent the entire universe of 
home mortgages originated in a given year either. The HMDA data 
include all mortgages originated by lenders that have a home or branch 
office in a metropolitan statistical area and exceed exemption thresholds 
on the size and the number of home purchase or refinancing loans 
made in a calendar year. For depository institutions, the threshold 
on asset size is adjusted annually on the basis of changes in the 
Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical 
Workers (CPI-W). For 2008 loan reporting, it was set at $39 million. 
Also, for depository institutions, the threshold for the number of 
loans is one per year. For nondepository institutions, the threshold 
on asset size is set at $10 million, and the threshold for the number 
of loans is 100 per year. In our comparison of the LPS data with 
the HMDA data, we have dropped LPS loans made in zip codes out-
side of an MSA. However, loans made outside of an MSA may still 
be included in the HMDA data if the lender is based in an MSA.
10Note that these numbers include loans made outside of an MSA. 
11B loans might arguably be considered near prime, but for convenience, 
we group both B and C loans together as subprime in this article.
12As Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008) emphasize, an important feature 
of the FICO score is that it measures a borrower’s creditworthiness 
prior to taking out the mortgage. FICO scores range between 300 
and 850. Typically, a FICO score above 800 is considered very good, 
while a score below 620 is considered poor. As reported on the Fair 
Isaac Corporation website (www.myfico.com), borrowers with FICO 
scores above 760 are able to take out 30-year fixed-rate mortgages 
with interest rates that are 160 basis points lower, on average, than 
those available for borrowers with scores in the 620–639 range.
13If we repeat the analysis using alternative outcome variables and 
different time periods (in default after 18 months, in foreclosure, 
30 days or more past due, and so on), the results are very similar.
14As part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 
(HERA), the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act  
of 2008 established a single regulator, the FHFA, for GSEs in-
volved in the home mortgage market, namely, Fannie Mae,  
Freddie Mac, and the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks. The FHFA 
was formed by a merger of the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight, the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), 
and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
government-sponsored enterprise mission team (see www.fhfa.gov 
for additional details).
15Note that we are looking at a relatively short period, and other  
researchers document changes in underwriting criteria that oc-
curred prior to 2004 (see, for example, Gerardi et al., 2008).
16Such mortgages are known as “hybrid ARMs.” They are also 
commonly identified as “2/28” and “3/27” loans, referring to 30-year 
ARMs that reset after two and three years, respectively. 
17The maximum dollar value for loans that can be securitized by 
GSEs (the conforming loan limit) is set annually by the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency. Prior to 2008, the conforming loan limit 
was set at the same level throughout most of the country. (In Alaska 
and Hawaii, the limit is equal to 150 percent of the limit for the 
other states.) The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008  
allowed the limit to increase to 115 percent of local median housing 
prices, not to exceed 150 percent of the standard loan limit of 
$417,000. This provision affected a number of counties in certain 
high-cost areas. 36 2Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
18As of December 2008, the LPS data are estimated to cover about 
18 percent of the total value of loans held on portfolio. 
19In September 2007, when the private securitization market had  
all but shut down, the GSEs were encouraged by members of 
Congress to expand their portfolios to support the market; see  
the correspondence from James B. Lockhart, the director of the 
OFHEO, to Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), at www.fhfa. 
gov/webfiles/2298/Schumerletter810attachment.pdf.
20Early refinancings were more common among loans originated in 
2004 and 2007. Consequently, early refinancings accounted for the 
vast majority of loans dropped from the sample—about two-thirds 
of all dropped prime loans originated in 2004 and 2007 (and more 
than 90 percent of all dropped subprime loans). By comparison, 
among the loans eliminated from the sample, just over 50 percent 
of the prime loans originated in 2005 and 2006 (and 78 percent of 
the subprime loans) were dropped for this reason.
21In effect, we are taking a slice through the two panels in figure 1 
(p. 19) at 12 months. An alternative modeling approach would be 
to estimate loan-level time to default as a function of a similar ar-
ray of characteristics, using a proportional hazard model. This ap-
proach is chosen by Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) and 
Gerardi et al. (2008), among others. As there are few time-varying 
covariates, the results from a straightforward probit model are like-
ly to be qualitatively similar. 
22Keep in mind that, for simplicity, the analysis uses the actual  
interest rate at loan origination and not the difference between  
this rate and some reference risk-free rate. 
23This exercise amounts to computing the average of marginal  
effects for individual loans, instead of the marginal effect at the 
mean, which is obtained by multiplying a hypothetical change in 
an explanatory variable by its regression coefficient. 
24The loan margin is increased for only ARMs, since fixed-rate 
loans by definition have a zero margin under all circumstances. 
Similarly, we incremented DTI for only those loans that had  
nonmissing DTI values.
25As discussed earlier, this may be due to our inability to account 
for piggyback loans. 
26Forecasts of 2007 loan defaults using 2006 model coefficients are 
the only exceptions.37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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